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In this chapter, I first revisit Spinoza’s obscure “ideas of  ideas” doctrine and his claim that 
“as soon as one knows something, one knows that one knows it, and simultaneously 
knows that one knows that one knows, and so on, to infinity” (E2p21s). In my view, 
Spinoza, like Descartes, holds that a given idea can be conceived either in terms of  what it 
represents or as a formally real act of  thinking: as I read the propositions, E2p7 (in which 
Spinoza presents his doctrine of  the “parallelism” of  minds and bodies) primarily concerns 
the former way of  conceiving of  an idea while E2p21 primarily concerns the latter. I pro-
pose that in E2p21, Spinoza makes a few crucial points about an adequate idea conceived as 
the “idea of  the idea,” or as the activity of  thinking: when one has an adequate represen-
tation of  p, one automatically knows that one is thinking that adequate representation, 
and this reflective knowledge cannot be improved.
I then turn to E2p43, “he who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true 
idea and cannot doubt the truth of  the thing.” Descartes had held that an atheist geometer 
has clear and distinct ideas that are, in fact, true. However, because the atheist does not 
know that a non‐deceiving God exists and created his nature, his otherwise faultless ideas 
can be rendered doubtful; the geometer’s cognition is thus not perfect knowledge deserving 
the title ‘scientia’ (AT VII 141). In E2p43, Spinoza seems to say that Descartes’s atheist 
geometer’s clear and distinct (adequate) ideas are not actually dubitable: the reasoning 
geometer has a true idea and so “cannot doubt the truth of  the thing.” For Spinoza, both 
reason and the best kind of  cognition, ‘scientia intuitiva,’ concern adequate ideas (E2p40s2) 
that are necessarily true (E2p41). Both “teach us to distinguish the true from the false” 
(E2p42). It seems that, despite the connotations of  its label, Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva is 
not special because it insulates a thinker from doubt in a way reason cannot.
I do not think this common take on E2p43 (or scientia intuitiva) is quite right. I will make 
three points. First, I suggest E2p21 and E2p43 rule out the most hyperbolic doubts (cf. the 
Third Meditation (AT VII 36)), so thinkers need no additional validation for the “adequate 
ideas of  properties of  things” and “common notions” employed in reasoning. However, 
reasoners can nevertheless be troubled by doubt about the existence of  the extra‐mental 
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world. Second, despite their differences, Spinoza follows Descartes at least this far: once 
one comes to adequate ideas of  God and God’s relation to things, one’s ideas cannot be ren-
dered doubtful. I concede that because one can reason to these adequate ideas, scientia intu-
itiva is not the only way to remove doubt. I conclude by briefly making a third point: there 
may still be something special about the way scientia intuitiva removes doubt.
2. What Is an Idea of an Idea?
Spinoza holds that one and the same thing can be considered under different attributes: “a 
circle existing in nature and the idea of  the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and 
the same thing, which is explicated through different attributes” (E2p7s. Cf. AT VII 102–
3). This is controversial, but I understand the “one and the sameness” here to be the “one 
and the sameness” of  (1) an adequate representation in thought of  some circle and (2) that 
circle enjoying extra‐mental extended reality (cf. Hübner 2019). To use the terminology of  
the time, an idea represents something S when S is objectively real in thought. Spinoza’s 
point is that when it comes to an adequate idea of  a body, what is in thought, the objectively 
real body, perfectly corresponds to the formally real body in extension: the “order and con-
nection of  ideas is the same as the order and connection of  things” (E2p7). One and the 
same essence, or ratio of  motion and rest (E2p13s), can be conceived either as enjoying 
objective reality in thought or as enjoying formal reality in extension.
Spinoza holds that the human mind is a representation of  the body: the “objectum of  the 
idea constituting the human mind” is the human body (E2p13). The objectively real body in 
thought (call this M) and the formally real body in extension (call this B) are one and the 
same essence conceived under different attributes (the human mind represents other 
bodies besides B by representing affections of  B. See Della Rocca 1996; D. Garrett 2017). 
But there is also “in God an idea, or cognition, of  the human mind” (E2p20). This brings us 
to the “idea of  ideas” doctrine. Spinoza begins by saying that the “union” of  the “idea of  
the mind” (call this idea I) and “the mind itself ” (i.e. M) is to be understood “in the same 
way” as M is united to B (E2p21d). Spinoza elaborates:
the idea of  the mind and the mind itself  are one and the same thing, which is conceived under 
one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of  the mind, I say, and the mind itself  
follow in God from the same power of  thinking and by the same necessity. For the idea of  the 
mind, or the idea of  the idea, is nothing but the form of  the idea [forma ideae] insofar as this is 
considered as a mode of  thinking without relation to the object [objectum].  (E2p21s)
“The idea constituting the human mind,” M, is the objectively‐real body. Now, the “idea of  
the mind,” I, is united to M because I represents M. Again, an idea represents something S 
when S is objectively real in thought; that I represents M is explained by the fact that M itself  
is objectively real. If  M is the objectively‐real body, then objectively‐real M is the objectively‐
real [objectively‐real body]. In other words, where M represents the body as something 
enjoying extended formal reality, I represents the body as an objectively‐real body.
I think it is likely that Spinoza is recasting the Cartesian view that an idea can be con-
ceived in terms of  what it represents or in terms of  what it has in common with all other 
ideas (see AT VII 8, 40–41). M is an idea conceived in terms of  what it represents, its object, 
which is what distinguishes it from other ideas: my mind represents one particular ratio of  
motion and rest in extension; your mind represents another. I is the idea conceived in terms 
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of  what is distinctive about the formal reality of  all ideas: I is “nothing but the form of  the 
idea, insofar as this is considered as a mode of  thought considered without relation to the 
objectum.” What is essential to ideas, regardless of  their objecta? If  the idea conceived as M 
represents a body as a formally real body, and the idea conceived as I represents the body as 
an objectively‐real body, then it seems we can say this: necessarily, ideas represent other 
things as well as represent their representational contents (whatever they may be) as in 
thought (cf. AT VII 160).
If  the “idea of  the mind” and the “mind itself ” are one and the same thing conceived in 
different ways within the attribute of  thought, and if  the idea of  the mind represents the 
mind itself, then we may read Spinoza as in broad agreement with some Cartesians like de 
la Forge and Arnauld (and, according to Simmons 2012, Descartes himself) on another 
point: namely, that an idea, by nature, does not just represent something else – a body or 
bodily affection (or another idea) – it also represents itself, where we can understand this 
reflexive representation as the idea’s immediate self‐awareness, or what Simmons calls 
“brute consciousness” (2012; cf. Nadler 2008, pp. 582–583).
3. Knowing that one Knows
Suppose ideas are essentially self‐reflexive, and that this reflexive awareness, the “idea of  
the idea,” makes the objectively‐real representational content present to mind. According 
to E1a6, a true idea’s representational content agrees with its ideatum. The idea of  an idea 
is thus true: there is no mismatch between the content present to mind and the content.
We may be tempted to think that an idea’s veridical reflexive awareness need not come 
with any reflective awareness, even when it comes to adequate ideas. It is one thing for the 
adequate idea a triangle’s interior angles sum to 180 degrees to be something I am aware of, 
as something present to my mind (where this representation is adequate because it can be 
fully explained by other (also non‐imagistic) ideas of  geometrical objects, e.g. line, plane, 
point, and Euclidean axioms, within my mind). It is another thing to also be thinking that 
I am thinking this idea, and perhaps yet another thing to be aware of  the adequacy of  the 
idea (whether or not I am in a position to describe the representation as ‘adequate’).
I could have a true reflective idea that I am thinking some adequate idea when I am 
thinking it, but it seems this is not an idea that is formed automatically. I think the penulti-
mate sentence of  E2p21s contests this tempting thought. “As soon as one knows [scit] 
something, one thereby [eo ipso] knows [scit] that one knows [scire] it . . .” As soon as one 
has an adequate idea of  a circle, one cognizes the circle adequately (i.e. “one knows”). But 
that adequate content is not merely present to mind – one also knows that the content is 
adequate and that one is thinking that content (i.e. “one knows that one knows”). 
Importantly, we need not understand this knowledge of  one’s knowledge in terms of  a 
higher‐order idea (an idea of  the idea of  the idea). In E2p21s, the statement about knowing 
that one knows comes immediately after Spinoza’s discussion of  the idea of  the idea, the 
“form” of  the idea. This suggests that here Spinoza is emphasizing something about that 
very form, not making an additional point that there is, in addition to an idea of  the idea, 
some other idea of  the idea of  the idea (and so on).
Read as a contestation of  the tempting thought mentioned above, Spinoza’s view 
diverges from Descartes’s in a way we could have expected. Descartes thought that having 
an idea puts a person in a position to have reflective knowledge, to know, for example, that 
one is thinking some idea (Broughton 2008; Alanen 2016). However, for Descartes, the 
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mere presence to mind of  a clear and distinct idea is not enough for even a belief  about that 
idea: in order to have belief, there must also be an affirmation, an additional act of  the will; 
if  knowledge presupposes belief, then there will also be an act of  will involved in reflective 
knowledge of  a clear and distinct idea (Radner 1988; Simmons 2012). Spinoza, however, 
does not think an additional thought, a separate act of  will, is needed: all ideas are affirma-
tions (E2p49; see Della Rocca 2003). We can, I think, understand Spinoza’s view as follows. 
Take the adequate idea that a triangle’s interior angles sum to 180 degrees. Conceived in 
terms of  its representational content, the idea is an affirmation of  properties of  a triangle 
(here the triangle is conceived sub specie aeternitatis, or as what a Cartesian would call a 
“true and immutable nature” (cf. E2p44, E5p29s, AT VII 64)). Conceived in terms of  what 
is present to mind, the veridical idea of  the idea, the affirmation is that one is thinking the 
adequate idea. At least when it comes to adequate ideas, reflexive awareness is also reflec-
tive awareness.
Yet Spinoza does not just say, “as soon as one knows something, one thereby knows that 
one knows it” – he also says that one “simultaneously knows that one knows that one knows 
[scit se scire quod scit], and so on, in infinitum.” Hobbes thought Descartes had committed 
himself  to the supposedly absurd position that every thought comes with a thought of  that 
thought, and a thought of  that thought, and so on, ad infinitum (AT VII 173). It looks like 
Spinoza avows this position (Curley 1969, pp. 144–150 and 1988, p. 64; Bolton 1985, 
p. 389; Melamed 2013, p. 154; Morrison 2017, pp. 66–68).
I think we can read the passage with a different emphasis: in saying that as soon as one 
knows something, one simultaneously has knowledge of  that knowledge (and so on), 
Spinoza is underscoring that the reflective knowledge is perfect or complete. In order to 
know that one knows (and what one knows), one does not need some further, higher‐order 
idea (an idea of  the idea of  the idea). There is not more one could do, or anything else that 
could happen, that would improve the reflective knowledge one automatically has as soon 
as one has an adequate idea. In knowing that one knows something, one already has all 
possible reflective knowledge.
But if  this reflective knowledge is knowledge, which kind of  veridical cognition is it? It 
does not seem to be reason: one has knowledge of  one’s own adequate ideas not because 
one has grasped why some conclusion follows from adequate ideas of  properties and 
common notions (E2p40s2). It does not seem to be scientia intuitiva either. That cognition 
proceeds “from an adequate idea of  the formal essence of  certain attributes of  God to the 
adequate cognition of  the [NS: formal] essence of  things” (E2p40s2). Scientia intuitiva 
hinges on having an adequate idea of  the “formal essence of  certain attributes of  God”; the 
reflective knowledge under discussion here is of  any adequate idea.
It does seem to be intuitive, however. It happens in a flash: as soon as one has an ade-
quate idea, one knows that one has that adequate idea. Furthermore, if  the Cartesian 
cogito is intuitive, then Spinoza’s reflective knowledge is intuitive too. For Descartes, a 
thinker can reflect on an idea and immediately know that he thinks and exists insofar as he 
is thinking (AT VII 140). Some hold that the cogito has an inferential structure but is nev-
ertheless intuitive (Kenny  1968; Wilson  1978; Curley  1978). Spinoza’s reflective 
knowledge, as I have described it, does not have this much structure, and so seems even 
more apt to be called intuitive. Again, the reflective knowledge that one is thinking an ade-
quate idea is the “idea of  the idea” which necessarily accompanies an adequate idea: they 
follow “in God from the same power of  thinking and by the same necessity,” and are indeed 
just one and the same mode conceived in different ways within thought (E2p21s). Although 
an adequate idea might represent an inference, and so the idea of  this idea would be reflec-
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tive knowledge of  an inference, one does not infer an idea of  the idea from an idea. As soon 
as one has an adequate idea, the knowledge that one has an adequate idea comes immedi-
ately, for free.
I have suggested that Spinoza holds that adequate ideas come, by nature, with reflective 
knowledge. But this is not to say that he thinks effortful introspection and reflection – or 
higher‐order ideas – are impossible. Indeed, such activity is arguably integral to a lot of  
thought: for example, the discernment of  properties that are “equally in the part and the 
whole” of  one’s representations of  perceived bodies (see E2p37–39) plausibly requires 
reflection on the bodies as presented in imaginative and perceptual ideas. Yet these repre-
sentations are confused to some degree (see E2p24–31). I read Spinoza as simply saying 
that as soon as one does come to have an adequate representation of, say, a property of  a 
triangle, one knows that one is thinking that adequate idea, that there is no further intro-
spection needed to determine what exactly one thinks about the triangle, and that what 
one does think cannot be made clearer or more distinct. To have an adequate idea is to 
understand (E2p43s); Spinoza’s point, I take it, is that one is not really understanding p 
unless one also knows, or understands, that one is understanding p (cf. Carriero 2020).
4. Knowing That one Knows
There are two kinds of  cognition that concern adequate, true ideas, reason and scientia 
intuitiva (E2p40s2, E2p41–E2p42), and in E2p43, Spinoza says that whoever has an ade-
quate, true idea “knows that one has a true idea and cannot doubt the truth of  the thing” 
(E2p43). This is clearly rejection of  skepticism, but we must be careful: as I explain, despite 
reasoners having true ideas they know are true, they may nevertheless wonder whether 
their adequate ideas of  bodies agree with anything formally real outside the mind.
Reason is presented thus: “it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal 
notions . . . from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of  properties of  
things” (E2p40s2). one reasons when one understands why some property necessarily 
follows from another: when one reasons through, say, a geometric proof, one sees why, 
given some axioms and a property that is “equally in the part and the whole” of  extension, 
extension (or some body) must also necessarily have some other property. It is, Spinoza 
adds, the “nature of  reason to contemplate things as necessary” (E2p44) and sub specie 
aeternitatis, or conceived without relation to time (E2p44c2d); when one reasons about the 
properties of  a triangle, one’s ideas are representations of  the properties triangles must 
have whenever and wherever.
An adequate representation of  a triangle conceived sub specie aeternitatis is an objec-
tively‐real eternally real triangle (cf. AT VII 64; Primus  2019). on the view I offered in 
Section 2, once one has an idea that, conceived as a representation, is adequate, that idea, 
conceived as an act of  thinking (the “idea of  the idea”), is an act of  reflective knowledge. 
Yet when one has an adequate idea of  a property of  a triangle, one does not just know (and 
know that one knows) what all triangles must be like if  they are; one also knows that there 
is a triangle that is – the objectively‐real eternally real triangle that is present to mind in 
one’s thought. one knows that the adequate idea of  the necessary property of  the triangle 
is true of  that triangle (cf. TIE §69, G II/26). once one has the adequate idea, “one knows 
[scit] one has a true idea and cannot doubt the truth of  the thing” (E2p43); one knows that 
one has “an idea which agrees with its object [ideato]” because one has an idea which does 
so agree (E2p43s).
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In the First Meditation, the Meditator says that arithmetic and geometry “contain 
something certain and indubitable,” regardless of  whether the things studied “really exist 
in nature or not.” Indeed, “it seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur 
any suspicion of  being false” (AT VII 20). I think Spinoza agrees: a geometer does have true 
ideas that are known to be true. In the Third Meditation, the Meditator allows that even 
those “transparent truths” that seem like they could not be false could indeed be false: 
unless the Meditator knows that a non‐deceiving God created his nature, he cannot be 
certain of  even 2+3=5 (AT VII 35–36). Readers of  the Meditations have debated the scope 
and power of  such doubt for centuries, as the questions it raises are central. Most famously, 
there is a worry about circularity: is Descartes saying that one cannot be certain of  an 
argument’s premises until one has proven God’s existence? But then how can one demon-
strate God’s existence?
I think Spinoza denies the possibility of  hyperbolic doubts: when one has an adequate 
representation of  a property of  a triangle, one knows that such a “transparent truth” is 
true – at least of  the triangle present in one’s thought. But is one thereby certain that those 
ideas are true of  extra‐mental reality? We might take Spinoza to answer in the affirmative: 
in reasoning about bodies, one is automatically certain that one’s adequate ideas are true 
of  bodies that are formally real in extension. one could hold that a commitment to the PSR 
leads Spinoza to reject an inexplicable bifurcation of  the representational character of  an 
idea (its clarity and distinctness, or adequacy) and its epistemic status (its truth or falsity) 
(Della Rocca 2007). As Perler (2017) puts it,
Whenever someone has an idea, he or she can be certain about the existence of  his or her own 
body. It simply makes no sense to conceive of  an idea as something detachable from a bodily 
state. Doing so would amount to introducing an inexplicable gap between two different realms.  
(pp. 229–230)
I would agree that one sort of  detachment does not make sense. one cannot “detach” the 
awareness of  one’s body (the “idea of  the idea”) from the representation of  one’s body (the 
idea, or the objectively‐real body). An “affect itself,” an idea considered as a representation 
of  a bodily affection (i.e. the objectively real bodily affection) cannot be coherently con-
ceived apart from the idea of  this idea, the “affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of  it” 
(E4p8, cf. E5p3). I take Spinoza’s position to be relatively simple: whether ideas are ade-
quate or inadequate, when there is thinking, there is always something that is thought. 
one may conceive a mode of  thought either as objectively real, as a representation, or as 
the activity of  thinking, but neither way of  conceiving suffices, by itself, to characterize the 
mode understood under the attribute of  thought.
However, I think the claim that it makes no sense to conceive of  an idea as something 
detachable from a bodily state needs qualification. Suppose one has an adequate idea of  a 
property of  one’s body (cf. E5p4). Whether this idea is conceived as representational 
content or as an act of  thinking, the idea can be fully explained by other ideas within one’s 
mind: the content – an adequate idea of  a bodily property – is explained by other ideas’ 
contents (e.g. common notions and other adequate ideas of  properties of  bodies); the act of  
understanding is explained by other acts of  understanding (i.e. the acts of  understanding 
those common notions and other adequate ideas of  properties). When one has an ade-
quate idea, one can completely account for the idea by appealing only to what is in thought.
In this case as I have described it, I think one can conceive of  the idea of  the body as 
“detachable” from the formally real body in extension. If  one realizes that one’s idea is 
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explained completely within thought, without any appeal to the existence of  bodies in 
extension, then one can legitimately wonder (especially if  one sees that the essence of  
any body does not include existence) whether an extra‐mental world of  bodies exists. 
one may be certain that one’s body is objectively real in thought but nevertheless unsure 
of  whether there is any formally real body in extension. The question of  whether one’s 
ideas of  bodies agree with anything extra‐mental is, for all I have said so far, a question 
one can entertain.
It is only given other adequate ideas, beyond adequate ideas of  properties of  bodies, that 
one is certain of  the existence of  one’s body in extension (and that one’s adequate ideas of  
properties are true of  that extra‐mental formal reality). Given an adequate idea of  sub-
stance under the attribute of  extension, one will see that extended (extra‐mental) sub-
stance is necessarily formally real. Given an adequate idea that all things are modes that 
can be conceived under different attributes, one will see that a necessary property of  
extension and one’s adequate representation of  that property of  extension are one and the 
same thing conceived under different attributes.
If  Spinoza holds, as I think he does, that one can have adequate ideas of  necessary prop-
erties of  things without having adequate ideas of  what, in all metaphysical rigor, those 
things are (i.e. necessary modes of  the one and only necessarily‐existing substance), then 
he can allow that one can have adequate cognitions that are not immune from all possible 
doubts. That is, Spinoza can agree with Descartes that the “atheist geometer” is doing 
something right – reasoning – but is nevertheless not in an epistemically optimal situation. 
Spinoza can also agree with Descartes that it is only once that geometer is certain that God 
is, what God is, what bodies and minds are, and how God is the cause of  things, that his 
ideas will be immune from all doubt – Spinoza would insist that Descartes’s ideas on such 
foundational metaphysical matters simply were not adequate (cf. Ep. 2, G IV/8).
5. Reasoning to Metaphysical Foundations
Reasoning through the Ethics is one way to come to the adequate ideas that silence doubts 
about the veridicality of  one’s adequate ideas of  bodies. By reasoning through the Ethics, 
one comes to know that there is just the one substance and its necessarily‐caused modes 
and that substance and modes can be considered under different attributes. one comes to 
know that one and the same essence (or one and the same necessary property) can be consid-
ered either as objectively real in thought or as formally real outside of  thought (E2p7), and 
either as eternal or as something existing “in relation to a certain time and place” (E5p29s). 
From this knowledge, one can infer that if  one has an adequate idea of  a necessary prop-
erty of  a cube in thought, then one can be sure that any extra‐mental cube must have that 
property. one can also infer that if  one has an adequate idea of  a true and immutable cube, 
then one can be sure that actual, enduring extension also has that property, insofar as that 
extended reality is cubical. (For readings according to which Spinoza denies that we can 
have such mathematical knowledge of  nature, see Melamed  2000; Peterman  2018; 
Schliesser 2018).
Before one has reasoned to adequate ideas of  what God and things are, one cannot 
remove all doubts: one cannot be sure that adequate ideas of  bodies are true of  extra‐
mental bodies. But one can still be certain of  the premises in the demonstrations of  what 
God and things are: the premises are known to be true in thought – and thought is an attri-
bute of  God. From reflection on one’s own thinking, one can recognize the truth of  axioms 
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and demonstrations. By reasoning, one can come to have adequate ideas of  very basic 
truths: e.g. that a substance is prior in nature to its affections (E1p1), or that two or more 
distinct things are distinguished either by a difference in attribute or a difference in mode 
(E1p4). on the basis of  these adequate ideas, one can deduce adequate ideas of  other 
truths, like that there cannot be two or more substances of  the same nature or attribute 
(E1p5), that there is just one necessarily‐existing, infinite substance, God (E1p7, E1p11, 
E1p14), that in nature there is nothing contingent (E1p29), and that an idea of  a body and 
a body are one and the same mode conceived under different attributes (E2p7).
Again, in order to be sure that one’s adequate idea Z of  a necessary property of  extension 
is true of  formally real extension, one must also have the adequate idea A that one and the 
same necessarily‐existing mode of  the one and only necessarily‐existing substance can be 
conceived under either the attribute of  thought or under the attribute of  extension. But 
reasoning to the adequate idea A has its drawbacks.
If  one reasons to A, one cognizes it as produced by adequate ideas of  axioms and ade-
quate ideas of  many other intermediate conclusions or propositions. one is certain of  the 
conclusion when one is “seeing the force” of  those demonstrations (cf. the first reply 
Spinoza gives to the Cartesian Circle objection in the DPP (G I 146–147)). But it is not easy 
for a human mind to cognize A as caused by this long, complex series of  demonstrations. 
one cannot insulate oneself  from the impingements of  nature and only think adequately 
(E4p4), so there will always be distractions and diversions. It is likely that one will rely on 
memory, both to keep track of  premises when one reasons and to retain the conclusion 
once one’s attention is drawn to other things. But memory is fallible (E2p40s2). Even if  one 
had the certainty that one’s adequate idea Z is true of  extra‐mental reality when one cog-
nizes A as necessitated by other adequate ideas within one’s mind, retrospective doubt is 
possible (cf. Della Rocca’s 2005 reading of  Descartes). If  one only manages to remember 
the conclusion A but not exactly why A must follow from axioms and other propositions, 
then one may doubt A, which in turn may prompt one to doubt whether one’s adequate 
idea Z is true of  anything outside of  thought.
6. Intuiting Metaphysical Foundations
Reasoning’s shortcomings do not lie with reasoning itself, but rather with finitude. As 
finite things, human beings have limited ability to control what they think about: even if  
they sometimes reason impeccably, they cannot – as Spinoza makes clear in Ethics Parts 3 
and 4 – always reason. Human minds thus often rely on memory, but memory can fail; if  
one relies on memory, it is possible to lose sight of  (or perhaps just lose) the ideas that 
secure the greatest certainty.
We can begin to see why a temporally immediate apprehension of  these adequate ideas 
would be preferable. I develop the details elsewhere, but I think scientia intuitiva – cognition 
which proceeds from “an adequate idea of  the formal essence of  certain attributes of  God 
to the adequate cognition of  the [NS: formal] essence of  things” (E2p40s2) – is such an 
apprehension (Primus 2017 and forthcoming). For other views, see A. Garrett (2003), D. 
Garrett (2009), Alanen (2011), Soyarslan (2016), leBuffe (2017), and Carriero (2019).
The “human mind has an adequate cognition of  God’s eternal and infinite essence” 
(E2p47). What is “equally in the part and whole” can only be conceived adequately 
(E2p38), and thought is equally in the part and whole of  any idea (mutatis mutandis for 
extension): every human mind has adequate ideas of  the attributes of  extension and 
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thought. Furthermore, every human mind has reflective knowledge of  these attributes. 
This is not as absurd as it sounds. However confused the representational contents of  my 
ideas may be (and however I might label them), I invariably know that I am thinking about 
extension when I am thinking about extension. I also know that my idea of  extension is 
adequate (although I may not label it as such). I might not know much about properties of  
extension, but I know that more investigation and introspection will not improve the 
fundamental idea of  extension I already have. Even as a toddler, I just knew what makes all 
bodies bodies, even if  that knowledge was not something I could articulate. Same goes for 
my idea of  thought: I just knew what makes all my feelings, sensations, and ideas thoughts 
(cf. Melamed forthcoming).
This is delicate, but I think this common reflective knowledge of  the attributes is com-
patible with not every human mind appreciating what it has. Not everyone has realized 
that their adequate ideas of  extension and thought are two ways of  conceiving God, the one 
and only infinite, eternal substance in which all things inhere as modes. But everyone has the 
right starting materials: we can deduce from the common reflective knowledge of  thinking 
and extension “a great many things which we can know adequately” (E2p47), like the 
foundational monist thesis that the one and only necessarily‐existing substance – God – 
can be conceived under either the attribute of  extension and thought (or an infinity of  
other attributes). We can, Spinoza continues in E2p47, “form the third kind of  cognition,” 
or scientia intuitiva (E2p47).
Cognition of  the third kind begins with the adequate idea I just called the “foundational 
monist thesis,” which is an adequate idea of  God as the one and only necessarily‐existing 
substance that can be conceived as a formally real thinking substance or a formally real 
extended substance. Importantly, this is not an adequate idea that must be cognized as the 
conclusion of  a series of  demonstrations, even if  we may have initially relied on demon-
strations to absorb our common reflective knowledge of  thinking and extension into our 
conception of  a necessarily‐existing, infinite, eternal God. once one has the correct con-
ception of  God, one can see, without working through any demonstration, that such a God 
must exist. Furthermore, if  one is attending to this adequate idea, it seems one can see, in 
uno intuitu, that things are modes necessarily caused by and inhering in the necessarily‐
existing substance, and which can, like substance, be conceived under different attributes. 
In apprehending God as the one and only substance, one immediately sees that everything 
that is not substance must be necessary modes of  substance.
We can understand scientia intuitiva as a confluence of  several necessarily veridical intu-
itions. like Descartes’s Fifth Meditation ontological proof, it is an intuition of  the necessary 
existence of  God (cf. AT VII 66–67). Yet it is not just an intuition of  God’s necessary existence; 
given what Spinoza’s God is – a necessarily‐existing substance that necessarily causes its 
own modes – it is also an intuition of  the necessitated existence of  all modes, as well as an 
intuition that all things, including one’s own mind and body, are modes (see Primus forth-
coming). It is also intuitive in the sense described in Section 3. As soon as one understands 
what God and things really are, one knows that one understands this. Given this immediate 
apprehension of  what God and things are, one can know that one’s adequate idea Z of  a 
property of  a body is an adequate idea of  a mode necessarily caused by the necessarily‐exist-
ing God, considered under the attribute of  extension. one knows that Z must be true – not 
just of  what is real in thought, but of  extra‐mental extended formal reality (cf. the second 
reply to the Cartesian Circle in the DPP (G I 148. Cf. TIE §79)). one is also certain that one’s 
adequate ideas of  properties of  things are not just true of  properties of  reality sub specie ae-
ternitatis, but are also true of  properties of  reality sub specie durationis.
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We can see one important difference between reason and scientia intuitiva. As I sug-
gested in Section 5, reason can remove the possibility of  doubt, but reasoning is only guar-
anteed to remove doubt if  one can retreat from other concerns to adequately cognize 
demonstrations; whether one succeeds in removing doubt depends on whether one has 
power over other finite things (i.e. over distractions). In contrast, scientia intuitiva does not 
presuppose the same control over the world: provided one attends to the right conception 
of  God (which may, admittedly, be exceedingly hard to do), one can remove doubt in a 
flash, anytime and anywhere.
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